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INTRODUcnON

In two recent rulings, the United States Supreme Court estab
lished new rules for managing risk and defending against sexual
harassment claims and liabilities. In Faragher v. City of Boca Ra
ton! and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,2 the High Court clari
fied when employers are liable for sexual harassment committed by
supervisors in the workplace. Significantly, these were only two of
the four cases heard by the Supreme Court in the 1998 term regard
ing sexual harassment. Within the four months prior to June 1998,
the Court issued two other decisions, Gebser v. Lago Vista In
dependent School District3 and Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv
ices, Inc. 4 Of the Court's thirty cases on the docket in 1998, four
involved sexual harassment issues.
In a society where sex is at the forefront of the news on an
almost daily basis and is an integral part of the most popular televi
sion series and movies, the tension between liberal societal attitudes
on sex and appropriate workplace behavior poses a conundrum for
employers. Providing a harassment-free workplace without being
overly paternalistic has become an almost impossible challenge for
many employers.
Still, employers who fail to address the challenge of preventing

* Steven D. Baderian and Elise Bloom are partners in the law firm of Jackson
Lewis Schnitzler & Krupman, a national law firm exclusively dedicated to the represen
tation of management in labor, employment, and benefits law and related litigation.
Valerie K. Wilde is an associate of the firm's New York, New York office. While the
information contained in this Article is believed to be accurate and authoritative, it is
not intended as a substitute for specific legal, insurance, or other professional advice.
1. 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998).
2. 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998).
3. 118 S. Ct. 1989 (1998).
4. 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998).
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sexual harassment face extremely high stakes. Recently, a jury in
Iowa awarded $80.7 million to a former manager of United Parcel
Service after she alleged that the company fostered a sexually hos
tile work environment and retaliated against her for complaining
that a driver poked her breast. 5 In another recent case, Astra
U.S.A. agreed to pay $10 million to settle allegations of widespread
sexual harassment in a consent decree negotiated with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC").6 The allega
tions specified that top management officials subjected female sales
representatives to unwelcome touching and sexual comments. 7
Despite the potential magnitude of the consequences of sexual
harassment, employers are not powerless. Indeed, it has become
imperative for employers to undertake risk management and em
ployee education and training programs. Included in such pro
grams should be: (1) a basic overview of sexual harassment law; (2)
a discussion of the four sexual harassment cases recently decided by
the United States Supreme Court; and (3) an examination of the
employer's preventive polices and strategies that are necessary to
establish an affirmative defense under the new cases.
I.

A.

SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND THE LAW

The Road to Faragher, Ellerth, and Oncale

In its entire history, the United States Supreme Court has
heard only six sexual harassment cases, four of which were heard in
the 1998 term. Although sexual harassment issues comprise a sig
nificant portion of employment discrimination litigation today, Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19648 was not originally drafted to
protect individuals on the basis of sex. Rather, sex discrimination
was added at the last minute as an attempt by opponents to defeat
the bill. Much to their surprise, the amendment passed. 9 Thus,
there was no legislative history pertaining to discrimination based
on sex under Title VII until almost a decade later, when it was
amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972.10
In the late 1970's two types of sexual harassment were first
5. See Jordan Lite, Ex-UPS Manager Awarded $80M, AP ONLINE, Feb. 12, 1998.
6. See EEOC v. Astra USA, Inc., No. CIV.A. 98-40014, 1998 WL 80324, at *1 (D.
Mass. Feb. 5, 1998); see also EEOC v. Astra USA, Inc., No. CN.A. 98-40014-NMG,
1999 WL 342043, at *1 (D. Mass. May 20, 1999).
7. See Astra, 1998 WL 80324, at * 1.
8. See 42 U.S.c. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994).
9. See Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 987 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (citations omitted).
10. PuB. L. No. 92-261, § 1, Mar. 24, 1972, 86 Stat. 103.
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identified by the academic community: "quid pro quo" and "hostile
environment."ll In 1980, the EEOC issued guidelines specifying
that sexual harassment, "whether or not it is directly linked to the
grant or denial of an economic quid pro quo, where 'such conduct
has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an indi
vidual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive working environment,''' is prohibited under Title VII.12
Interestingly, the terms "hostile environment" and "quid pro quo"
do not appear in the text of Title VII. Nevertheless, these terms
have been used to differentiate the types of misconduct for which
employers are increasingly being held liable.
1.

The Birth of Sexual Harassment Law

It was not until twelve years after the enactment of Title VII

that a court first held that sexual harassment was actionable under
the statute. In Williams v. Saxbe,13 the plaintiff sued her employer
for sex discrimination under Title VII, alleging that she was termi
nated after refusing a sexual advance made by her immediate su
pervisor. The United States District Court for the District of
Columbia held that conditioning job advancement on an em
ployee's acquiescence to sexual demands constitutes sex discrimina
tion and that the application of an employer's policy or practice on
the basis of gender alone is sufficient to prove sex discrimination. 14
The court also held that a supervisor's imposition of conditions of
sexual favors on female employees was tantamount to the employer
doing the same, and that while Title VII is not concerned with mon
itoring personal disputes between employees, it is intended to pro
hibit discrimination in the workplace. 1s
One year after the Williams decision, the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia also recognized quid pro
quo harassment as a violation of Title VII. In Barnes v. Costie,16
the court held that a supervisor who terminated an employee be
cause she refused his sexual advances acted in violation of Title
11. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2264 (1998) (citing
CATHERINE MACKINNON, THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE
OF DISCRIMINATION (1979».
12. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (citing EEOC
Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (1985».
13. 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976).
14. See id. at 658-59.
15. See id. at 660-61.
16. 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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VIIP The court, reversing the lower court's decision that the plain
tiff "was discriminated against, not because she was a woman, but
because she refused to engage in a sexual affair with her supervi
sor," explained that the prohibition on discrimination based on sex
is not limited to differences based on gender.18 Rather, it is only
necessary that gender be a contributing factor to the
discrimination. 19
Although most courts readily recognized quid pro quo harass
ment as a form of sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII, it took
another five years for a court to recognize hostile environment
claims under Title VII. In Henson v. Dundee,2° the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit relied on the 1980 guide
lines issued by the EEOC21 to hold that "[a] pattern of sexual har
assment inflicted upon,an employee because of her sex is a pattern
of behavior that inflicts disparate treatment upon a member of one
sex with respect to terms, conditions or privileges of employ
ment. "22 The court explained that a hostile or offensive atmos
phere created by sexu~l harassment can, standing alone, constitute
a violation of Title. VII.23
In reaching this b.olding, the Henson court also relied upon
Bundy v. Jackson. 24 In Bundy, the District of Columbia Circuit
held that sexual harassment claims can be established, even without
tangible job detriment, where employees are subjected to a disctim~
inatory work environment.25 Although the Bundy court did'not use
the term "hostile environment" in its discussion, the Henson court
specifically focused on hostile work environment cases and laid out
the elements necessary for a hostile environment claim: first, the
employee must belong to a protected group; second, the employee
17, See id, at 995,
18, See ilL at 990,
19, See id,
20, 682 F,2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982),
21. Through the issuance of its 1980 Guidelines, the EEOC stated its position
regarding several issues, First, the EEOC acknowledged that sexual harassment is dis
crimination based upon sex and is not limited to quid pro quo harassment Second, the
EEOC recognized the hostile work environment theory of sexual harassment Third,
the EEOC suggested that employers implement a sexual harassment policy, Fourth, the
EEOC created the "knew/should have known" concept for establishing an employer's
liability under the hostile environment theory. See EEOC Guidelines on Sexual Har
assment, 29 C.F,R § 1604.11 (1997) (effective Nov. 10, 1980).
22. Henson, 682 F.2d at 902.
23. See id.
24. 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
25. See id. at 943.
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must have been subject to unwelcome sexual harassment; third, the
harassment must be based upon sex; and fourth, the harassment
must have affected a "term, condition or privilege" of employ
ment. 26 The court emphasized that tangible economic harm is not
necessary for the fourth element, but the alleged conduct "must be
sufficiently pervasive so as to alter the conditions of employment
and create an abusive working environment."27

2. Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson
By the early 1980's, most courts recognized quid pro quo and
hostile environment sexual harassment claims. The Supreme
Court, however, did not address sexual harassment until 1986 in the
landmark case of Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson. 28
Although Meritor has often been cited for the proposition that
an employer will be strictly liable for the quid pro quo sexual har
assment of an employee by a supervisor,29 this language does not
appear in the decision. The case itself dealt with employer liability
for hostile environment claims premised on the actions of a supervi
sor; however, implicit in the Court's discussion was the understand
ing that under the EEOC guidelines employers may be strictly
liable for quid pro quo harassment by supervisors. 3o
The plaintiff in Meritor alleged that she had been sexually
harassed by her supervisor throughout her four years of employ
ment. 31 During that time, she had received several merit-based
promotions. 32 However, she was eventually terminated for exces
sive use of sick leave, and she subsequently sued her employer for
sexual harassment. 33
In holding the employer liable for sexual harassment, the
Supreme Court found that economic harm is not required for a
plaintiff to assert a sexual harassment claim. 34 Rather, the appro
priate inquiry is whether the alleged conduct is "sufficiently severe
or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment
26. See Henson, 682 F.2d at 903-04.
27. Id. at 904.
28. 477 U.S. 57 (1986)
29. See, e.g., Davis v. City of Sioux City, 115 F.3d 1365 (8th Cir. 1997); Nichols v.
Frank, 42 F.3d 503 (9th Cir. 1994).
30. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 71-73.
31. See id at 60.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See id. at 67-68.
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and create an abusive working environment.' "35 The Court also
found that a plaintiff's admission that she submitted "voluntarily"
to her supervisor's sexual overtures was not a defense to a sexual
harassment suit. 36 "The correct inquiry is whether [the plaintiff] by
her conduct indicated that the alleged sexual advances were unwel
come."37 Finally, the Court held that an employer will not be
strictly liable for a supervisor's conduct. 38 In a cryptic discussion,
the Court noted that the District of Columbia Circuit was incorrect
in "concluding that employers are always automatically liable for
sexual harassment [committed] by their supervisors," and added
that simply because an employer has not received notice of harass
ment "does not necessarily insulate that employer from liability."39
Although the Supreme Court in Meritor recognized a hostile
environment sexual harassment claim for the first time, it declined
to offer a "definitive rule" on employer liability under TItle VII.40
The federal courts of appeals, however, have consistently held that
if a plaintiff establishes a quid pro quo 41 claim, then the employer is
vicariously liable. 42 On the other hand, the courts have set forth
various and sometimes conflicting standards for employer liability
for hostile environment harassment perpetrated by supervisory
employees. 43
3.

The Aftermath of Meritor

Following Meritor, the courts were faced with questions con
cerning: (1) whether a plaintiff could prove quid pro quo sexual
harassment where there was no tangible job detriment; (2) whether
any circumstances existed that would warrant an employer's stric~
liability for a hostile work environment; (3) what conduct would be
sufficiently severe to constitute a hostile working environment; and
(4) what standards should be used to judge whether the conduct
35. Id. at 67 (citing Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982».
36. See id. at 68.
37. Id.
38. See id. at 72.
39. Id.
40. See id.
41. To establish a quid pro quo claim, a plaintiff must show that (1) submission to
unwelcome advances of a sexual nature was made an express or implied condition of
receiving job benefits, or (2) rejection thereof resulted in job detriment. See EEOC
Guidelines on Sexual Harassment, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1997).
42. See e.g., Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311, 1316 (11th Cir.
1989).
43. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2282 (1998).
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created a sexually hostile working environment. One of the first
issues that arose was determining when an employer "should have
known" about allegedly pervasive sexually harassing conduct. Af
. ter proving a prima facie case of hostile environment sexual harass
ment, most circuits required plaintiffs to carry the burden of
establishing that the conduct which created the hostile environment
should be imputed to the employer. 44 Under this analysis, plaintiffs
needed to prove that the employer either failed to provide a rea
sonable avenue for a complaint or knew of the harassment but did
nothing about it.45 Thus, an employer would not be liable if an ef
fective anti-harassment policy existed and the employer investi
gated the complaint in accordance with that policy.
Subsequently the Second Circuit, in Karibian v. Columbia Uni
versity,46 a decision often quoted as at odds with this analysis, held
that the employer could be liable for sexual harassment, even if un
reported, when the alleged harasser is a high-level executive. 47
However, the court did not provide a definition of high-level execu
tive. 48 The court determined that regardless of notice or the rea
sonableness of complaint procedures, an employer would be liable
if a supervisor used his actual or apparent authority to further the
harassment, or if he was otherwise aided in accomplishing the har
assment by the existence of the agency relationship.49 In an agency
situation such as in Karibian, the identity of the supervisor and the
employer merge, and the supervisor's knowledge is imputed to the
employer, thereby rendering the employer liable for the supervi
sor's conduct.50 If, however, the harasser had been a low level su
pervisor who did not rely on his supervisory authority to carry out
the harassment, the employer would not have been liable unless
"'the employer either provided no reasonable avenue for complaint
or knew of the harassment but did nothing about it.' "51
Other circuits have adopted a more pro-employer approach to
liability in sexual harassment cases. In Gary v. Long,52 the Circuit
Court for the District of Columbia affirmed the dismissal of a plain
44.
1992).
45.

See Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan Appliance Ctr., Inc., 957 F.2d 59, 63 (2d Cir.

See id.
46. 14 F.3d 773 (2d Cir. 1994).
47. See id. at 780.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. Id. (quoting Kotcher, 957 F.2d at 63).
52. 59 F.3d 1391 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

350

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21:343

tiff's Title VII claims against her employer on the grounds that an
employer would escape liability for a supervisor's hostile work envi
ronment harassment where the employer could show it had "imple
mented measures such that the victimized employee either knew or
should have known that the employer did not tolerate such conduct
and that she could report it to the employer without fear of adverse
consequences."53 The court, relying on general principles of agency
law, reasoned that the anti-harassment policy should have reason
ably put the plaintiff on notice that her supervisor's harassing con
duct was in violation of the policy, and therefore was not authorized
by the employer. 54 Thus, the court held that the existence of an
effective and publicized anti-harassment policy absolves an em
ployer from Title VII liability.55
4.

Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.

After Meritor and its progeny, it became evident that the lower
courts needed additional guidance in determining what standards
should be used to determine the existence of a sexually hostile work
environment. For example, a number of courts began to modify the
"reasonable person" standard for determining whether an environ
ment was offensive. 56
In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. ,57 the Supreme Courtclari
fied the standard for determining when a hostile environment ex~
ists. This standard examines whether the conduct was both
objectively hostile, meaning that a reasonable person would find it
hostile, and subjectively hostile, meaning that the plaintiff found it
hostile. 58 The Court did not discuss the "reasonable woman" stan
dard. The Court also clarified that a plaintiff need not suffer "tangi
ble" or "economic" discrimination for a Title VII violation.59
Specifically, a plaintiff who suffered psychological harm as a result
53. Id. at 1398.
54. See id.
55. See id.; see also Bouton v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 29 F.3d 103, 110 (3d Cir.
1994) (holding that an effective grievance procedure that is known to the employee and
addresses the alleged harassment in a timely manner shields the employer from
liability).
56. See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991) (adopting the
"reasonable woman" standard, which considers whether a reasonable woman would
find that the accused's conduct was "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the condi
tions of employment and create an abusive working environment").
57. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
58. See id. at 19.
59. See id. at 21.
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of sexual harassment could still establish an actionable Title VII
claim. 60 However, while psychological harm would be relevant, it
would not be required to establish a hostile environment claim. 61
After the Court's reaffirmation in Harris that "offensive" con
duct should be viewed from the perspective of the reasonable per~
son, the next logical question was to determine the reasonableness
of the employer's response. In a widely publicized decision, Torres
v. Pisano,62 the Second Circuit considered the reasonableness of
the employer's failure to investigate a sexual harassment claim
where the victim requested that her complaint remain confidential.
The court held that a supervisor's failure to report the sexual har
assment of an employee by another supervisor was reasonable
where the employee requested, verbally and in writing, on two sep
arate occasions, that her complaint be kept confidential. 63 The
court cautioned, however, that "[t]here is certainly a point at which
harassment becomes so severe that a reasonable employer simply
cannot stand by, even if requested to do so by a terrified
employee. "64
B.

The Supreme Court's Recent Cases

The courts have been split for over a decade on the applicable
standards for employer liability in hostile environment cases. The
Supreme Court finally addressed this issue in 1998 in two cases de~
cided on the same day. The holdings of these two cases, coupled
with those of two other cases decided in 1997, will substantially
change the landscape of sexual harassment law in the United States,I
1.

Defining Employer Liability

In Faragher v. City of Boca Raton 65 and Burlington Industries,
60. See id. at 23.
61. See id.
62. 116 F.3d 625 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 563 (1997).
63. See id. at 639.
64. Id. But see Gallagher V. Delaney, 139 F.3d 338, 348 (2d Cir. 1998) (reversing
grant of summary judgment for defendant where plaintiff, while reporting supervisor's
sexually harassing conduct to human resources manager, told manager to handle the
matter discreetly); WIXted V. DHL Airways, Inc., No. 95-C-2296, 1998 WL 164922, at
*10 (N.D. III. Apr. 7, 1998) (holding that summary judgment was not proper where a
jury could reasonably find that a supervisor's failure to report the sexual harassment of
an employee by another supervisor, despite employee's request to keep the matter con
fidential, was negligent where there were threats of serious physical harm to the victim
if the employer did not act promptly).
65. 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998).
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Inc. v. Ellerth,66 the Supreme Court sanctioned the imposition of

automatic employer liability where a supervisor engages in sexual
misconduct and directly misuses his or her authority to discharge,
demote, or cause the employee "tangible" job-related conse
quences. In so doing, the Court held that when the offending con
duct is by a supervisor, the employer's liability no longer turns on
whether the alleged harassment is quid pro quo or hostile environ
ment. Rather, the critical question is whether there was a tangible
job detriment. If so, the employer is strictly liable. Where a super
visor's sexually harassing misconduct does not cause tangible job
related harm to the employee, the employer can avoid liability or
reduce damages if it proves, as an affirmative defense, "(a) that the
employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct
promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff
employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive
or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid
harm otherwise. "67

a.

Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth

In Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,68 the plaintiff,· a sales
representative, resigned after allegedly being subjected to repeated
sexual advances by a mid-level manager. According to the plaintiff,
the manager made sexual advances to her over a period of one year
and told her that he "could make [her] life very hard or very easy at
Burlington."69 Despite rebuffing his advances, she suffered no re
taliation or adverse employment action.70 In fact, she was pro
moted.71 Furthermore, even though she was familiar with the
company's anti-harassment policy, the plaintiff never reported the
harassment to management until after she resigned. 72 Although the
plaintiff allegedly suffered sexual harassment, the facts of her case
made it difficult for her to frame a viable sexual harassment claim.
She could not prove quid pro quo harassment because she never
66. 118 s. Ct. 2257 (1998).
67. Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2293. The distinction between eliminating liability or
reducing damages, a question not answered by the High Court, is a significant one from
a practical standpoint. Once there is a finding of liability, no matter how small, the
employer is also liable for the plaintiffs attorneys fees, which in many cases can be
substantial.
68. 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998).
69. Id. at 2262.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See id.
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submitted to her supervisor's alleged advances, nor did she suffer a
job detriment. Further, she could not establish a hostile environ
ment claim because she could not prove her employer knew or
should have known of the harassment.
The question presented to the Court was whether a claim of
quid pro quo sexual harassment is viable when the alleged harasser
makes unfulfilled threats and no tangible employment action is
taken against the employee. The Court, however, reframed the
plaintiffs claim as a hostile work environment claim since it in
volved only unfulfilled threats.73 It held that employers will be vi
cariously liable for actionable hostile environments created by
supervisors with immediate or successively higher authority over
victimized employees. 74 "When no tangible employment action is
taken, a defending employer may raise an affirmative defense to
liability or damages ...."75 This affirmative defense is the same
one set forth in Faragher, requiring the employer to prove, first,
that it "exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly
any sexually harassing behavior," and second, "that the plaintiff un
reasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective
opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm other
wise."76 As in Faragher, the Court in Ellerth emphasized that no
affirmative defense is available when the supervisor takes a tangible
employment action against the employee. 77 Because no tangible
employment action was taken against the plaintiff, the Court re
manded the case to give Burlington the opportunity to prove the
affirmative defense.'8
73. See id. at 2265. In reframing the plaintiff's claim as a hostile environment
claim, the Court removed the plaintiff's lawyers' incentive to frame claims as quid pro
quo claims so that the employers would be held to a vicarious liability standard. See id.
at 2264-65. The Court explained that the labels "quid pro quo" and "hostile environ
ment" are not controlling for purposes of employer liability. See id. at 2265. Rather,
the inquiry relevant to employer liability is whether the supervisor took any tangible
employment action against the employee. See id. The Court explained, however, that
the terms are relevant "[t]o the extent that they illustrate the distinction between cases
involving a threat which is carried out and offensive conduct in general ...." Id.
74. See id. at 2270. The Court's analysis in both Ellerth and Faragher applied
only to sexual harassment perpetrated by a supervisor. Accordingly, the standards for
judging harassment perpetrated by a co-employee (i.e., was the harassment sufficiently
severe or pervasive, did the employer know of the conduct and fail to reasonably re
spond, should the employer have known about the conduct), remain unchanged.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See id.
78. See id. at 2271.
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Faragher v. City of Boca Raton

In Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,79 the plaintiff, a female life
guard, sued the City of Boca Raton ("City") on a hostile environ
ment claim. She alleged that her supervisors created a sexually
hostile work environment by repeatedly subjecting her and other
female lifeguards to uninvited and offensive touching and lewd and
offensive remarks. 80 Although she told another supervisor about
the offensive behavior, the supervisor did not report the alleged
misconduct to· his superiors. 81
Shortly before the plaintiff resigned, another female lifeguard
wrote to the City's personnel director and complained about
harassing conduct by the same supervisors. 82 The City investigated
the report and reprimanded the supervisors. 83 Subsequently, even
though the plaintiff had not complained to City officials, she filed
suit claiming the City was liable for the harassment she allegedly
suffered. 84
Thus in Faragher, the Supreme Court faced the issue of
whether an employer could be liable for a first-line supervisor's sex
ually harassing behavior of which it was not officially aware and
which did not result in a tangible adverse employment action. 85 Re
lying on traditional agency principles, the Court sought to resolve
the conflict between an employee's right to be free of sexual harass
ment and the limits on employer liability for an "agent's"
misconduct. 86
The Court held that while an employer is subject to vicarious
liability for an actionable hostile environment created by a supervi
sor with immediate or successively higher authority over the em
ployee, the employer is allowed to present an affirmative defense
when no tangible employment action is taken. 87 The Court cited
79. 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998).
See id. at 2280.
See id. at 2281.

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

See id.
See id.
See id. at 2280.

85. In other words, the Court had to determine whether the City "should have
known" about the conduct.
86. See id. at 2282.
87. See id. at 2292-93. Interestingly, as an appellate judge on the Court of Ap
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Justice Scalia dissented from the court's en
bane decision denying a rehearing of Vinson v. Taylor. See Vinson v. Taylor, 760 F.2d
1330 (D.C. Cir. 1985), affd, Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). The
dissenters rejected a standard of vicarious liability for a "supervisor's alleged sexual
harassment when the employer was not even made aware of and given the chance to
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discharge, demotion, and undesirable reassignment as' examples of
tangible employment actions. 88
The Court found that the City's sexual harassment policy had
never been effectively disseminated among the beach employees
and the internal complaint procedure did not provide a mechanism
for by-passing the offending supervisors.89 On that basis, the Court
found that the City could not have exercised reasonable care to pre
vent the harassing behavior as a matter of law and remanded the
case to the district court for reinstatement of the judgment in favor
of the plaintiffyo
2.

Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District

In Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District,91 a case
decided only a few days before Faragher and Ellerth; the Supreme
Court limited a school district's liability for the alleged sexual har
assment of a student by a teacher. 92 The plaintiff, a high school
student, had engaged in a sexual relationship with one of her teach
ers.93 The relationship ended when a police officer discovered them
having intercourse, and the district immediately terminated the
teacher. 94 The student had never reported the teacher's conduct
while she maintained the sexual relationship with him, and there
was no evidence that the district was aware of the relationship.95
The plaintiff subsequently sued the school district under Title IX of
rectify the consequences of the harassment alleged." [d. at 1333 (Bork, J., dissenting).
In Faragher, Justice Scalia joined with Justice Thomas in dissent and once again ex
pressed disapproval of vicarious liability in the absence of adverse employment action.
See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2294 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justices Thomas and Scalia
argued that an employer should not be held vicariously liable if a supervisor creates a
hostile work environment absent an adverse employment consequence, for the same
reason expressed in Scalia's dissent in Ellerth. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Under
such circumstances, the untenable result would be that "employers will be liable
notwithstanding the affirmative defense, even though they acted reasonably, so long as
the plaintiff in question fulfilled her duty of reasonable care to avoid harm . . . . In
practice, therefore, employer liability very well may be the rule." Id. (Thomas, J., dis
senting) (citing Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2274 (1998) (citations
omitted».
88. See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2293.
89. See id.
90. See id. The district court awarded the plaintiff one dollar in nominal damages
on her TItle VII claim. See id. at 2281.
91. 118 S. Ct. 1989 (1998).
92. See id. at 2000.
93. See id. at 1993.
94. See id.
95. See id. at 1993-94.
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the 1972 Education Amendments,96 which prohibits sex discrimina
tion by educational institutions receiving federal financial
assistance.97
While the Supreme Court in the Faragher and Ellerth cases in
creased the protection provided to employees against sexual harass
ment in the workplace, ironically, it narrowed the protection
provided to students at school. The Court in Gebser distinguished
Title IX's implied private cause of action and lack of legislative his
tory and Title VII's express private cause of action. 98 The Court
held that a school district would not be liable under Title IX for a
teacher's sexual harassment of a student where the district did not
have actual notice of the harassment and did not display deliberate
indifference towards the harassment. 99
While it may seem that the Court's result in Gebser conflicts
with its decisions in Faragher and Ellerth, Justice Ginsburg's dis
senting opinion, joined by Justices Souter and Breyer, foreshad
owed the subsequent holdings of those cases by recognizing that an
effective anti-harassment policy would be an affirmative defense. 1oo
At the same time, however, these three justices, along with Justice
Stevens in a separate dissenting opinion, criticized the Court's hold
ing and argued that "[a]s a matter of policy, the Court ranks protec
tion of the school district's purse above the protection of immature
high school students . . . ."101
3.

Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.

Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 102 a case involv
ing same-sex sexual harassment, is the only co-worker sexual har
assment case that the Supreme Court has heard.103 In Oncale, a
male employee brought a Title VII action against his former em
ployer, a male supervisor, and two male co-workers, alleging that
he had been sexually harassed. 104 Specifically, the plaintiff alleged
that he had been sexually assaulted by his supervisor and co-work
96. PuB. L. No. 92-318, § 901, June 23,1972,86 Stat. 373 (codified as amended in
20 V.S.C. §§ 1681-88 (1994».
97. See id.
98. See id. at 1997-98.
99. See id. at 2000.
100. See id. at 2007 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
101. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
102. 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998).
103. See id.
104. See id. at 1001.
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ers and threatened with homosexual rape. lOS Although the plaintiff
had reported numerous incidents of harassment to supervisory per
sonnel, no remedial action was ever taken. I06 The Supreme Court,
in a unanimous opinion, held that sex discrimination consisting of
same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title VIV07
The Court allayed fears that liability for same-sex sexual har
assment will transform Title VII into a "general civility code for the
American workplace" by emphasizing that the crucial inquiry is still
whether "members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous
terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other
sex are not exposed."108 Thus, the standard under which sexual
harassment cases are evaluated remains unchanged, regardless of
whether one alleges same-sex sexual harassment or opposite-sex
sexual harassment. The Court, however, did caution that careful
consideration of the social context in which particular behavior oc
curs is always required. For example:
[A] professional football player's working environment is not se
verely or pervasively abusive ... if the coach smacks him on the
buttocks as he heads onto the field-even if the same behavior
would reasonably be experienced as abusive by the coach's secre
tary (male or female) back at the office.109

In advising courts to examine the context of any alleged inap
propriate behavior, the Court reaffirmed that actionable hostile en
vironment claims will exist only where the conduct is severe or
pervasive.u° This leaves room for courts to examine the alleged
harasser's behavior, determine that the alleged conduct is not suffi
ciently severe as a matter of law, and decide cases on summary
judgment.
Additionally, Oncale provides a uniform standard for lower
courts regarding the viability of same-sex sexual harassment claims
that previously did not exist. For example, prior to Oncale some
jurisdictions, such as the Fourth Circuit, required the plaintiff to
show that his harasser was homosexual,lll while the Fifth Circuit
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
(4th Cir.

See id.
See id.
See id. at 1002.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 1003.
See id.
See id. at 1002 (citing Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 143
1996».
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rejected all same-sex sexual harassment claims. 112 By contrast, the
Seventh Circuit held that sexual harassment was "always actiona
ble, regardless of the harasser's sex, sexual orientation or motiva
tions."113 With Oncale, the Supreme Court ensured that same-sex
sexual harassment would be actionable under Title VII regardless
of any of these considerations.
C.

Post-Faragher and Ellerth: The Unanswered Questions

The EEOC, as well as the courts, have consistently counseled
employers about the need to promulgate policies prohibiting sexual
harassment and providing effective complaint investigation proce
dures. The Supreme Court's decisions in Faragher and Ellerth ele
vate these basic precautions to a mandate, providing an affirmative
defense for employers to avoid all liability where the harassing su
pervisor's misconduct causes no tangible job-related harm to the
employee and the employer proves both elements of the affirmative
defense. The first element requires an employer to: (1) prevent
and (2) promptly correct any sexually harassing behavior. The sec
ond element requires the employer to prove that the employee: (1)
failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportuni
ties provided by the employer or (2) failed to avoid harm otherwise.
Although the Supreme Court's decisions in Faragher and El
lerth provide some clarity in determining when an employer will be
liable for its supervisors' misconduct, the decisions leave unresolved
a number of questions for the lower courts to answer. These unan
swered questions, in conjunction with the higher burden of proving
the affirmative defense discussed above, will make it much more
challenging for employers to win sexual harassment cases on sum
mary judgment.
1.

When is the Employer's Failure to Prevent Harassment
Actionable?

In applying the affirmative defense, it is difficult, if not impos
sible, to determine whether an employer will be liable where it
thoroughly investigates an employee's allegations that a supervisor
created a hostile work environment and takes steps to end the of
fending conduct. Imagine the following scenario. The employer
112.
rev'd, 118
113.
118 S. Ct.

See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118 (5th Cir. 1996),
S. Ct. 998 (1998).
Doe ex rei. Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated,
1183 (1998».
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maintains a "zero tolerance" policy prohibiting sexual harassment.
The employee appropriately follows the employer's guidelines on
filing a sexual harassment complaint. Accordingly, the employer
conducts a detailed investigation, follows up with the appropriate
documentation of the incident(s), and takes disciplinary action, if
necessary. No tangible adverse consequences have been taken
against the employee.
From these facts, it appears that both employer and employee
have taken measures, to the best of .their ability, to prevent and
correct any sexually harassing behavior. However, because the sec
ond element of the affirmative defense set forth in Faragher and
Ellerth requires that the employer prove that the employee did not
"take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities pro
vided by the employer," or failed to avoid harm otherwise, the de
fense appears to be unavailable to the employer that did respond to
an employee's complaint. Consequently, the employer will be lia
ble for its supervisor's conduct, despite having followed the
Supreme Court's mandate to prevent and promptly correct any sex
ually harassing behavior.
In this scenario, the employer finds itself in a conundrum. It is
unclear whether an employer's prompt and thorough investigation
of a sexual harassment complaint will serve as a bar to liability or
simply be a means of reducing potential liability. Once the em
ployer learns of an employee's sexual harassment complaint, the
employer has little incentive to investigate the complaint if the em
ployer will be liable regardless of its response. From a purely eco
nomic standpoint, employers may wonder why they should
terminate or discipline high-level executives or "rainmaking" super
visors who have been accused of sexual harassment, if the ultimate
outcome of the complaint will be that the employer is found liable
regardless of its actions.
2. How Mayan Employee "Fail to Avoid Harm
Otherwise "?
As discussed earlier, an employer proves the second element of
the affirmative defense by showing either that the employee failed
to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities
provided by the employer or that the employee failed to avoid
harm otherwise. It is fairly easy to determine whether the em
ployee took advantage of the employer's preventive or corrective
opportunities. The employer need only ask such questions as
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whether the employee complained about the harassment or
whether the employee participated in a subsequent investigation.
A more challenging question arises in determining whether the
employee failed to avoid harm. It is precisely this question, how
ever, that may provide an avenue for the employer to prove the
employee did not meet his or her burden in preventing the sexual
harassment. 114 Moreover, the Court provided virtually no guidance
regarding the circumstances under which an employee will be con
sidered to have failed to avoid harm. The Court's only mention of
this element of the affirmative defense consists of one sentence:
[W]hile proof that an employee failed to fulfill the corresponding
obligation of reasonable care to avoid harm is not limited to
showing an unreasonable failure to use any complaint procedure
provided by the employer, a demonstration of such failure will
normally suffice to satisfy the employer's burden under the sec
ond element of the defense.11 5

The Court's discussion leaves open to interpretation what an em
ployer must prove to satisfy the second element of the affirmative
defense.
3.

What is a "Tangible Adverse Employment Action"?

In the Ellerth case, the Supreme Court defined a tangible em
ployment action as "a significant change in employment status, such
as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly
different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change
in benefits."116 As the Court acknowledged, where an employee
has not suffered direct economic harm, it is unlikely that the em
ployer's behavior constitutes a tangible employment action. 117 For
example, in Crady v. Liberty National Bank & Trust CO.,118 the Sev
enth Circuit found no adverse employment action where the branch
manager of a bank was transferred to a collections officer position
at another branch and retained the same salary and benefits.119
114. For example, one possible scenario may exist where an employer's policy
provides a number of supervisors to whom employees may report complaints of sexual
harassment, but the employee fails to report the harassment to any of the listed
supervisors.
115. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2293 (1998) (emphasis
added).
116. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2268 (1998).
117. See id. at 2269.
118. 993 F.2d 132 (7th CiT. 1993).
119. See id. at 135-36.
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However, it should be noted that whether the employee suf
fered direct economic harm may not be the only factor examined by
a court in determining whether the employer took a tangible em
ployment action against the employee. In Crady, the court ac
knowledged that the unique circumstances of each case must be
examined, including whether an employee's duties were "signifi
cantly diminished" or an employee's title was changed to one that is
"less distinguished."l20 Precisely such an assessment was made by
the Sixth Circuit in Kocsis v. Multi-Care Management, Inc. 121 The
court held that the plaintiff did not suffer a materially adverse em
ployment action when she was transferred to a new position and
her rate of pay and benefits did not change, her duties were not
substantially modified, and she did not lose any prestige in her posi
tion due to a change in working conditions or a change in title. 122
Conversely, other courts have found an adverse employment
action regardless of the fact that the plaintiff did not suffer direct
economic harm. In Collins v. Illinois,l23 the Seventh Circuit ex
plained that "adverse job action is not limited solely to loss or re
duction of payor money benefits," and held that a plaintiff who was
transferred away from a job she enjoyed and was deprived of her
office, telephone, and business cards suffered adverse action suffi
cient to state a claim for retaliation under Title VII.124 Similarly, in
Dahm V. Flynn,125 the Seventh Circuit, reversing summary judg
ment for the defendant, held that demoting an employee from an
"intellectually stimulating" job to a routine job, even without a loss
in benefits or salary, may constitute adverse employment action. 126
Clearly, courts have been forced to consider what constitutes a
tangible adverse employment action. At least one commentator
has stated that future litigation will focus on the situation where an
employee believes his or her "status" has been diminished as a re
sult of some employment action taken by the employer. 127 Given
120. See id. at 136.
121. 97 F.3d 876 (6th Cir. 1996).
122. See id. at 886-87.
123. 830 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1987).
124. See id. at 703-04 (emphasis added).
125. 60 F.3d 253 (7th Cir. 1994).
126. See id. at 257; see also McGrenaghan v. Saint Denis Sch., 979 F. Supp. 323,
326 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (holding that a job transfer with significantly diminished responsi
bility constitutes adverse job action even though there was no change in salary or
benefits).
127. See Dominic Bencivenga, Looking For Guidance, High Court Rulings Leave
Key Terms Undefined, 220 N.Y.L.J. 5 (1998).
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the Supreme Court's failure to provide a framework for what con
stitutes a tangible adverse employment action, substantial litigation
regarding this issue will certainly arise.
4.

In What Contexts Will the Affirmative Defense be
Applied in the Future?

Nowhere in Faragher and Ellerth did the Supreme Court limit
the application of the affirmative defense to sexually hostile work
environments. The Court specifically stated that "[a]n employer is
subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an action
able hostile environment created by a supervisor with immediate
(or successively higher) authority over the employee."128 Conceiva
bly, the affirmative defense is available whenever a plaintiff alleges
a hostile work environment perpetrated by a supervisor, whether
that environment is the result of discrimination based on the indi
vidual's race, religion, national origin, sex, color, age, or disability.
Since the Faragher and Ellerth decisions, many courts have had
the opportunity to apply the affirmative defense to hostile environ
ment claims. In Fierro v. Saks Fifth Avenue,129 the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York applied the
affirmative defense to a claim brought by an employee who alleged
a hostile environment based upon his national origin. The em
ployee, who was terminated for petty embezzlement, sued the com
pany for national origin discrimination based upon his allegations
that a supervisor had made derogatory comments about his na
tional origin (Italian American) and the national origin of his wife
(Hispanic)PO At trial, the plaintiff testified that he never com
plained about these comments because he was" 'afraid of repercus
sions'" and believed that filing a complaint would only bring about
an '" [un]pleasCl.nt outcome.' "131
In granting summary judgment to the employer, Judge Brieant,
writing for the court, stated that an employee's fear of repercus
sions or conflict does not excuse the employee from making full use
of an employer's complaint procedures. 132 Focusing on the second
element of the affirmative defense, which requires that the em
ployer prove the employee unreasonably failed to take advantage
128. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2270 (1998) (emphasis
added).
129. 13 F. Supp. 2d 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
130. See id. at 485-86.
131. Id. at 487.
132. See id. at 492.
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of its complaint procedures, the court emphasized that employees
must accept responsibility for reporting harassment because em
ployers cannot combat harassment of which they are not aware. 133
Interestingly, it appears that fear of retaliation may not excuse
an employee from failing to follow an employer's complaint proce
dures, even where the supervisor threatens to terminate the em
ployee for reporting the discriminatory conduct. For instance, in
Sconce v. Tandy Corp. ,134 the United States District Court for the
Western District of Kentucky applied the affirmative defense and
found the employer not liable where an employee who alleged hos
tile environment sexual harassment never reported her supervisor's
behavior to the employer .135
In Sconce, the plaintiff alleged that her supervisor groped her,
made sexual innuendos, and threatened to terminate her if she told
anyone.136 She refused his advances; and although she was aware
of the employer's policy against sexual harassment, she failed to file
a complaint in accordance with that policy, and instead requested a
transfer to a lower paying position at another location. 137 Applying
the affirmative defense set forth in Ellerth, the court found that the
employer's comprehensive policy against sexual harassment, com
bined with the employee's failure to report the harassment, pre
~luded
the employer's liability for the supervisor's alleged
'-.. ..
behavior.138 Like the court in Fierro, the Sconce court stated that
an employee's fear of retaliation does not excuse his or her failure
to follow the employer's procedures for filing a sexual harassment
complaint. The court stated, "[A] threat of termination, without
more, is not enough to excuse an employee from following proce
dures adopted for her protection. To hold otherwise would render
the affirmative defense meaningless. "139
The plaintiff in Sconce also alleged quid pro quo sexual harass
ment.1 40 However, because the plaintiff never submitted to her su
pervisor's alleged sexual demands, was never denied a promotion,
and voluntarily requested a transfer, the employer had not taken
any specific job action against the employee and was not held
~.

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

See id.
9 F. Supp. 2d 773 (W.D. Ky. 1998).
See id. at 778.
See id. at 775.
See id.
See id. at 777-78.
Id. at 778.
See id. at 775.
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strictly liable. 141 Other courts which have addressed sexual harass
ment claims since the Supreme Court's decisions in Faragher and
Ellerth have similarly denied employers' motions for summary
judgment. 142
II.

THE KEY TO AVOIDING LIABILITY: PREVENTIVE POLICIES
AND TRAINING FOR MANAGERS AND SUPERVISORS 143

A.

Two Critical Words: Prevention and Response

In the Faragher and Ellerth decisions, the Supreme Court is
sued two clear mandates to employers. First, take immediate, bold,
and continuing steps to prevent harassment from occurring. Pre
vention is the only "no liability" option since any tangible adverse
employment action flowing from harassment automatically results
in liability for the employer. Second, use prompt "reasonable care"
to prevent and correct any sexually harassing behavior. If an em
ployer does so and an employee unreasonably fails to_take advan
tage of those preventive or corrective opportunities, an employer
will not be liable for the harassment absent tangible adverse em
ployment action. Consequently, an employer's efforts at preven
tion and response are critical.
B.

Ten Steps to Take Immediately

To enhance their ability to prevent sexual harassment claims
and to maximize the likelihood of an effective response to a com
plaint, employers should consider implementing the following
workplace measures: 144
141. See id. at 775-76.
142. See Alverio v. Sam's Warehouse Club, 9 F. Supp. 2d 955, 961 (N.D. 111. 1998)
(denying defendant's summary judgment motion and holding defendant vicariously lia
ble for the sexually hostile environment created by one of its supervisors but stating
that defendant may raise the affirmative defense as to liability or damages); Hill v.
Gateway Reg'l Health Sys., No. 97-CA-1130-MR, 1998 WL 412623, at *1 (Ky. Ct. App.
July 24, 1998) (holding that supervisor's conduct, consisting of at least twelve offensive
comments over a period of fourteen months, could rise to the level of a sexually hostile
work environment and remanding for defendant to raise affirmative defense at trial).
143. The following discussion is borrowed from The Jackson Lewis Ten Step
Response to the New Rules on Workplace Sexual Harassment ("Jackson Lewis Ten
Step Response"), with the permission of Jackson Lewis Schnitzler & Krupman.
144. The Jackson Lewis Ten Step Response is not an exhaustive list. Because all
items on this list may not be appropriate for every employer, each sexual harassment
program should be tailored to the employer's culture and resources.
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Review Your Sexual Harassment and Anti-Retaliation
Policy

A strong sexual harassment policy is the linchpin in the preven
tion and defense of sexual harassment claims. The policy should be
written in plain language-defining the types of conduct which po
tentially violate the policy and stating that sexual harassment and
retaliation for complaints of harassment are prohibited and will not
be tolerated by the employer. To develop an effective policy, an
employer should consider incorporating some, if not all, of the fol
lowing suggestions:
• offer examples of potentially violative conduct with statements
that the examples are not intended to be all-inclusive;
• provide employees with convenient and reliable mechanisms for
reporting incidents of sexual harassment and retaliation and for
participating in related investigations;
• post the name, work location, and telephone number of employer
representatives-both male and female-to whom employees are
to make complaints of harassment and retaliation;
• ensure that at least one employer representative is at the em
ployer's facility whenever it is in operation;
• encourage employees to report incidents promptly either verbally
or in writing;
• provide a timetable for reporting harassment, beginning and
completing an investigation, and responding to a complaint;
• inform employees of the potential consequences of failing to take
advantage of the employer's preventive or corrective
opportunities;
• inform employees-supervisors and non-supervisors alike-of
disciplinary action that may be taken if they are found to have
violated the employer's policy.
2.

Identify All Supervisors and Make Them Accountable
for Compliance with the Employer's Sexual
Harassment and Anti-Retaliation Policy

The Supreme Court held that employers are liable when a "su
pervisor" harasses an employee over whom the supervisor has im
mediate (or successively higher) authority. Take steps immediately
so that the employer, rather than a jury, determines who is and who
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is not a "supervisor." Include "commitment to equal employment
opportunity" as a qualification for every supervisory position.
... ,3.. rrain All Supervisors on Sexual Harassment Prevention,

To take advantage of the Supreme Court's new affirmative de
fense, an employer must prove that it took "reasonable care" to
prevent harassment and to promptly correct any sexually harassing
behavior. Providing effective sexual harassment prevention train
ing for all supervisors enhances an employer's ability to take advan
tage of this defense. Additionally, effective training will increase
the likelihood that a supervisor will not engage in sexually harassing
conduct in the first place and will respond appropriately to a com
plaint of harassment. All supervisors should be required to attend
s'uch training. To emphasize its importance, a senior manager
should introduce the training.
4.

Train' Non-SuperVisory Employees on the Sexual
Harassment Policy and the Procedures to Follow
if They Experience Sexual Harassment

By educating non-supervisory employees, an employer
breathes life into its sexual harassment prevention policy. The
training further enhances an employer's ability to establish that it
took reasonable steps necessary to prevent sexually harassing be
havior. It also can help establish that an aggrieved individual un
reasonably failed to take advantage of the employer's preventive
and corrective opportunities.
5.

Obtain a Signed Receipt When Distributing the Sexual.
Harassment Policy

Soinetimes an employee does not remember, or denies recelv
ing a copy of a sexual harassment prevention policy. As a result, a
jury must det~rmine whether the employer actually communicated
the policy. To remove any doubt about dissemination of the policy,
an employer should obtain and retain a signed receipt from every
employee to whom the employer distributes a sexual harassment
prevention policy.
6.

Peri'odically Redistribute the Sexual Harassment Policy
and Obtain Updated Receipts

Remind employees periodically of the employer's policy
prohibiting sexual harassment by redistributing the policy and ob
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tain a receipt each time. This should be done at least annually. By
showing that the employee must have been aware of the policy, the
employer enhances its ability to prove that an employee unreasona
bly failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective meas..
ures provided by the employer. .
7.

Instruct Appropriate Managers on the Guidelines for
Conducting Investigations of Sexual Harassment
Complaints

While it is unlikely that an employer can prevent all conduct
which might give rise to a complaint of sexual harassment, in some
cases an employer may avoid liability if it promptly and effectively
investigates the harassment complaint. Because investigations into
allegations of sexual harassment are often difficult, an employer
should give managers who are responsible for conducting and doc\.l
menting such investigations as much guidance as possible before
complaints are filed. However, an employer should make all man,.
agers responsible for notifying human resources or the general
counsel if any allegations are brought to their attention and warn
supervisors that disciplinary action will be taken if a supervisor fails
to do so.
8.

Incorporate the Sexual Harassment Policy into New
Employee Orientation

With each new hire, an employer has an opportunity to estab
lish a record of taking reasonable care to prevent sexual harass
ment. By distributing the policy and incorporating sexuai
harassment prevention into new employees' orientation programs,
employers may reduce sexual harassment claims and strengthen
their defenses if such claims are brought.
9. Document Efforts to Prevent and Correct Harassment
and Any Employee's Failure to Take Advantage of
the Opportunities Provided by the Employer
An employer can eliminate disputes about its efforts to prevent
and respond to sexual harassment claims by documenting those ef
forts. An employer should keep a complete record of its preventive
programs, publications to. employees, training for managers and
employees, all complaints received and investigated, and any
r~mediation efforts taken. It would also serve the employer's best
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interests to document any failure by an employee to take advantage
of the corrective opportunities provided by the employer.
10. Assert the New Affirmative Defense in Pending or
Future Sexual Harassment Lawsuits
While the Supreme Court's decision provides employers with a
new defense for sexual harassment claims, employers must affirma
tively present and prove it. Employers should take steps to ensure
that all pending sexual harassment litigation is reviewed immedi
ately to determine whether this affirmative defense, if available, has
been presented and pursued. Amending court papers or requesting
additional discovery may be appropriate. Also, it may be beneficial
for an employer to consider raising this defense in other types of
employment discrimination cases, especially those involving
harassment.
CONCLUSION

Recent Supreme Court cases have resolved a number of ques
tions regarding the law of sexual harassment. Employers must take
definite action to ensure that they can utilize the new affirmative
defense to employer liability. The Supreme Court has made it clear
that employers must adopt preventative policies and strategies if
they are to avoid the significant risks posed by sexual harassment
claims.

